



McDonald v. City of Chicago: Did Justice Thomas 
Resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
from the Dead?  (And Did Justice Scalia Kill It 
Again?)* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.1 
The Supreme Court recently held in a 5–4 decision that the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is “fully applicable to the 
States”2 through the Fourteenth Amendment.3  A plurality of the Court 
agreed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
constitutional vehicle that incorporates the right.4  One Justice, however, 
broke with 137 years of precedent to find “a more straightforward path” 
to the same conclusion.5  Justice Thomas relied on the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Second 
Amendment against the States.6  This reasoning, though cited as the 
petitioners’ primary argument,7 was not given serious consideration by 
any other opinion in the case.  Possibly the most noteworthy aspect of the 
                                                     
 * Christian B. Corrigan.  J.D. candidate 2012, University of Kansas School of Law; B.A. 
2009, University of Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank the Kansas Law Review board and staff for 
their hard work and dedication during the editing process.  I would also like to thank the Federalist 
Society for inspiring my passion for originalism and for helping me to greater understand the 
founding principles of freedom, federalism, and judicial restraint.  Finally, and above all else, I 
would like to thank my family for their continuous and unwavering support throughout this and all 
my endeavors.  They are the lifeblood of my successes and I am truly grateful for all they have done. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 2. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (plurality opinion). 
 3. Id. at 3050. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 6. Id. at 3059. 
 7. Id. at 3028 (plurality opinion). 
CORRIGAN FINAL 1/23/2012  9:43 AM 
436 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
decision is that Justice Scalia, a self-proclaimed textualist, originalist,8 
and fierce critic of substantive due process,9 acquiesced to using the 
much-ridiculed doctrine10 of substantive due process to apply the Second 
Amendment to the States.11 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause presents a unique and important 
question in constitutional law.  Its exact meaning, role, and relevancy are 
without consensus today.  Originalists generally agree that the framers 
intended to incorporate at least some of the protections guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights.12  Some originalists would like to see the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause revived and used to limit the creation of 
unenumerated rights—others still may believe in premise, but decline to 
advocate such a radical change in constitutional jurisprudence.13 
Operating from an originalist perspective of constitutional 
interpretation—which assumes that the Clause should be interpreted 
according to what it meant to the public when it was adopted in 186814—
this Note practically evaluates the future prospects of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause in light of the McDonald v. City of Chicago plurality 
opinion and the concurrence of Justice Thomas.  In an originalist’s 
perfect world, the Supreme Court would wipe clean its constitutional 
slate and use the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enforce the Bill of Rights against the States rather than 
the Due Process Clause.  Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence as it 
stands now, however, may permanently preclude incorporation via the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
                                                     
 8. Alan Gura, Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, The Tell-Tale Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
in CATO INSTITUTE, CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 2009–2010, at 163, 183 (2010) (citing Hon. 
Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address to the Federalist Society National 
Lawyers Convention (Nov. 22, 2008)). 
 9. See KEVIN A. RING, SCALIA DISSENTS 304 (2004). 
 10. That is much ridiculed by originalists.  See, e.g., Gura, Shapiro & Blackman, supra note 8, 
at 170 (“[T]here was no evidence—none—that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
understood the Due Process Clause to transmit substantive rights . . . .”).  “Justice Scalia famously 
derided substantive due process as an “atrocity’ and an act of ‘judicial usurpation.’”  Id. (quoting 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 85 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 11. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 12. Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1295, 1309 & n.71 (2009) (citing RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES 
IN CONTEXT 292 (2008)). 
 13. Such pragmatism is seen in Justice Scalia’s approach in McDonald.  See discussion infra 
Part IV.B. 
 14. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A 
DEBATE, at vii (2011). 
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In reality, there are three obstacles that stand in the way.  The first is 
stare decisis—redefining federal privileges or immunities would likely 
require overturning 138 years of precedent going back to the Slaughter-
House Cases.15  Second, even Justice Scalia has submitted to the fact that 
substantive due process now enforces individual rights against the States, 
therefore making it extremely impractical to switch doctrines of 
incorporation.16  Finally, even if the Court considered abandoning 
substantive due process, it is extremely wary of doing so without a clear 
consensus on the full scope and meaning of federal privileges or 
immunities.17 
II. HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment 
Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of 
Rights applied only to the Federal Government and not to the States.18  In 
the 1833 case of Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, “the 
[Supreme] Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, . . . firmly 
rejected the proposition that the first eight Amendments operate as 
limitations on the States, holding that they apply only to the Federal 
Government.”19 
But, after the Civil War, the addition of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments “fundamentally altered our country’s federal 
system.”20  In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, southern states 
enacted “black codes” designed “to force blacks into a state of 
subservience and subjugation.”21  The laws restricted the civil rights and 
liberties of former slaves.22  In response, Congress enacted “the first 
                                                     
 15. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); discussion infra Part II.C. 
 16. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 17. See id. at 3030–31 (plurality opinion); id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  At oral 
argument, petitioners’ counsel answered a line of questioning regarding the privileges and 
immunities to be incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and admitted that he could not “give a 
full description of all unenumerated rights that are going to be protected.”  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 61–64, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521). 
 18. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028 (plurality opinion) (citing Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of 
Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. KERMIT L. HALL, PAUL FINKELMAN & JAMES W. ELY, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 262 (3d ed. 2005). 
 22. Id. 
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congressional protection of individual liberty in American history”23: the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.24  Because “[s]ome members of Congress 
doubted the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,” Congress 
passed the Fourteenth Amendment.25 
However, “[d]ebate still rages over the purpose or ‘intent’ of these 
amendments.”26  “But, at a minimum, the framers of the [Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth A]mendments believed they were expanding the Bill of 
Rights to the states and giving Congress broad plenary power to protect 
both civil rights and civil liberties . . . .”27 
B. Interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
There has been much debate in recent decades over the meaning of 
“[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”28  There are 
disagreements at virtually every step of the analysis, even among those 
who consider themselves originalists.29  First, there is disagreement about 
“whether the clause was intended simply to require the states to make 
their laws apply equally to all their citizens or to mandate a certain 
substantive content to state law.”30  The former interpretation focuses on 
equality and reads the Clause as a nondiscrimination provision similar to 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the 
Constitution, which prevents States from treating visitors differently than 
residents.31  The latter, substantive interpretation reads the Clause as a 
mandate for a “substantive package of entitlements” to be guaranteed 
under state law.32 
                                                     
 23. Id. at 265. 
 24. Id. at 262. 
 25. Id. at 266.  “In 1870, Congress ‘reenacted’ the 1866 act, on the assumption that the . . . 
Fourteenth . . . Amendment[] gave additional constitutional authority to the law.”  Id.  Congress 
went on to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1875, however, after the rights of blacks began to deteriorate 
in 1873 as Democrats began to regain control of the southern states.  Id. at 267.  In 1883, the 
Supreme Court found the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional.  Id. 
 26. Id. at 259. 
 27. Id. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 29. See Calvin Massey, Privileges or Immunities, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 390, 390 (Edwin Meese III, David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2005). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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The substantive view itself has two competing interpretations as to 
the meaning of the privileges or immunities of federal citizenship.33  The 
first interpretation applies the Bill of Rights and every other 
constitutional guarantee to the States.34  The second interpretation views 
the Clause as applying only the Bill of Rights to the States and nothing 
more.35  This interpretation takes a Lockean view of privileges or 
immunities by defining them broadly as natural rights given to all people 
that cannot be taken away by government.36  Advocates of these views 
are generally referred to as “incorporationists” in the context of the 
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.37 
In addition to various disagreements about the meaning of the clause, 
there is even disagreement about whether it has any meaning at all.38  
Judge Bork, an originalist icon, famously described it as nothing more 
than an “ink blot.”39  Of course, Judge Bork’s interpretation is directly at 
odds with Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Marbury v. Madison that 
“[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to 
be without effect.”40  Chief Justice Marshall’s pronouncement 
notwithstanding, thanks to an infamous 1873 decision by the Supreme 
Court in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
was virtually dead for over a century until 1999 when the Court invoked 
it in Saenz v. Roe.41 
C. The Slaughter-House Cases 
Slaughter-House is an important part of the debate over the meaning 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The general consensus is that 
Justice Miller’s majority opinion “rejected any significant role for the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause in the protection of individual rights 
generally, and in the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms more 
                                                     
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of 
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 647–49 (2000). 
 38. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
166 (1990), quoted in Aynes, supra note 12, at 1300. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
 41. Massey, supra note 29, at 393. 
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specifically.”42  It has also been maligned as “‘one of the most 
outrageous actions of [the] Supreme Court.’”43  Right or wrong, 
Slaughter-House has been controlling precedent on the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause for 138 years.44 
During Reconstruction, the State of Louisiana created the Crescent 
City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company in New 
Orleans.45  The Louisiana Legislature, concerned with sanitary 
conditions in the community, confined slaughtering to the area owned by 
Crescent City, effectively creating a monopoly because it forced 
individual butchers to rent space from the government-owned entity.46  A 
group of local butchers challenged the Louisiana law as unconstitutional 
because it “denied them their right to work and consequently violated . . . 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”47  Louisiana claimed the monopoly 
was a legitimate regulation under its state police power.48 
Justice Miller, writing for a 5–4 majority, rejected the butchers’ 
claims by finding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause only protected 
rights that “owe their existence to the Federal government, its National 
character, its Constitution, or its laws.”49  Justice Miller began his 
opinion by examining the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, explaining 
how the drafters designed the Citizenship Clause of Section 1 to overrule 
Dred Scott v. Sandford50 “by making all persons born within the United 
States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States.”51  
Justice Miller quickly turned his attention to Section 2, where the 
controversy began. 
                                                     
 42. Newsom, supra note 37, at 650–51. 
 43. MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 58 (1999) (quoting CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, 
NAMED AND UNNAMED 89 (1997)). 
 44. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3089 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that, as of 2010, the Slaughter-House precedent had stood for 137 years); see also Saenz v. 
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999) (relying on Slaughter-House in interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
 45. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 38 (1873). 
 46. Id. at 38–43, 57, 62–63, 87. 
 47. Newsom, supra note 37, at 651 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 21 L. Ed. 395, 396–99 
(1873)). 
 48. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 87. 
 49. Id. at 79, quoted in McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3022 (plurality opinion). 
 50. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
 51. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73. 
CORRIGAN FINAL 1/23/2012  9:43 AM 
2011] MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO 441 
First, Justice Miller pointed out the sharp distinction between 
citizenship of the United States and citizenship of the states as “clearly 
recognized and established.”52  Justice Miller then declared that the 
Constitution only protects the privileges or immunities of federal 
citizenship and that any rights left to be protected by the States were out 
of reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.53  Before defining federal 
privileges or immunities, however, Justice Miller—using Justice 
Washington’s list from Corfield v. Coryell54—first defined the state 
privileges or immunities guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2: 
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those 
rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you 
limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, 
neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of 
other States within your jurisdiction.55 
Under this interpretation, Article IV, Section 2 was essentially a 
nondiscrimination clause that prevented a State from treating visitors 
differently under the law than it did its own citizens. 
So, then, what exactly are federal privileges and immunities?  Justice 
Miller declined to explicitly rule on this question, and the Court “excused 
[itself] from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States which no state can abridge, until some case involving those 
privileges may make it necessary to do so.”56  Justice Miller did, 
however, give an idea of what rights might constitute privileges or 
immunities.57  First, he cited the “very few express limitations which the 
Federal Constitution imposed upon the States—such, for instance, as the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws 
impairing the obligation of contracts.”58  Second, seemingly anticipating 
the argument that his list of federal privileges and immunities was too 
narrow, Justice Miller listed several other rights, such as the rights 
to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have 
upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to 
                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 74. 
 54. Id. at 75–76 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 
3,230)). 
 55. Id. at 77. 
 56. Id. at 78–79. 
 57. Id. at 77. 
 58. Id. 
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seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its 
functions.  [A citizen] has the right of free access to its seaports, 
through which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the 
subtreasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several States.59 
He also mentioned the right “to demand the care and protection of the 
Federal government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high 
seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government,” “the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus,” the “right to use the navigable waters of the 
United States,” and “all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with 
foreign nations.”60 
Most notably, Justice Miller mentioned the “right to peaceably 
assemble and petition for redress of grievances,”61 a line which parallels 
some First Amendment protections.62  This is significant because it 
arguably left the door open to interpreting Slaughter-House as 
incorporating at least some of the Bill of Rights against the States63 
because the plaintiffs did not actually bring any claims under the Bill of 
Rights,64 and the Court did not explicitly deny incorporation.65  Justice 
Miller did inquire, however, whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
“transfer[red] the security and protection of all the [aforementioned] civil 
rights . . . from the States to the Federal government.”66  To this question, 
he replied that “no such results were intended by the Congress which 
proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which 
ratified them.”67 
Regardless of Justice Miller’s intent, subsequent Supreme Court 
cases closed any opening left by him in Slaughter-House.68  As this Note 
will discuss later, Justice Miller’s inclusion of some First Amendment 
rights in his list is an important point to consider as incorporationists 
                                                     
 59. Id. at 79 (alteration in original) (quoting Crandell v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 
(1868)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 79. 
 62. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 63. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3060 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 64. See Newsom, supra note 37, at 658. 
 65. See id. at 666. 
 66. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77. 
 67. Id. at 78. 
 68. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (noting the more narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the 
aftermath of Slaughter-House). 
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grapple with the necessity of overruling Slaughter-House.  In the last 
decade, scholars have revisited Justice Miller’s opinion and concluded 
that it is friendlier to incorporation than once thought—arguing that it 
simply fell victim to a series of bad Supreme Court decisions after it was 
decided.69  Justice Thomas recognized this in McDonald.70 
There are a variety of theories on the method to Justice Miller’s 
reasoning.  The conventional wisdom has been that he restricted the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause because the only alternative was to open 
a Pandora’s Box of new legal rights.71  Others argue that Justice Miller 
was primarily worried about a major shift in the balance between state 
and federal rights based on his concern that the Supreme Court would 
effectively become the “‘perpetual censor” of the state legislatures.72  
Originalists point out the irony of such concern, given that the method 
ultimately chosen to enforce the Bill of Rights against the States—
substantive due process and its kaleidoscope of rights—is subject to 
exactly that criticism. 
D. Saenz v. Roe 
The next time the Court seriously dealt with the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause came in the 1999 case of Saenz v. Roe.73  California 
passed a law limiting welfare benefits for new residents of the state.74  In 
order to prevent people from moving to California for larger welfare 
checks, the statute limited new residents to receiving the same amount of  
 
                                                     
 69. E.g., Newsom, supra note 37, at 649 (stating that “[n]ot once in [Slaughter-House] did the 
Court seriously suggest . . . that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not incorporate Bill of 
Rights Freedoms” and that “it suggests that core Bill of Rights freedoms are among the ‘privileges 
[and] immunities of citizens of the United States’ protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (third 
alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1)). 
 70. 130 S. Ct. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see infra 
text accompanying notes 141–43. 
 71. Newsom, supra note 37, at 666 (citing LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?  A COMMENTARY 
ON THE SUPREME COURT’S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 199 (1975)). 
 72. William J. Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the 
Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 177 (2002) (quoting Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) at 78); Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 337 (2005) (same). 
 73. 526 U.S. 489, 511 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court today breathes new life 
into the previously dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—a 
Clause relied upon by this Court in only one other decision . . . .”). 
 74. Id. at 492 (majority opinion). 
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welfare benefits they would have received in their previous state of 
residence for a period of one year.75 
Finding an unenumerated right to travel in the Constitution,76 Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority, struck down the statute as a violation of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it infringed on citizens’ “right to choose to be citizens ‘of the 
State wherein they reside.’”77  This right to travel had three components: 
the right to enter one state and leave another; “the right to be treated as a 
welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien”; and, for those who want 
to be permanent residents, the right to be treated equally to native-born 
citizens.78  The last right was the principal right violated by the State of 
California.79  Supporting this proposition, Justice Stevens cited the only 
real existing precedent on the Privileges or Immunities Clause—
Slaughter-House.80  While acknowledging the controversial nature of 
Slaughter-House, he asserted that “it has always been common ground 
that this Clause protects the third component of the right to travel.”81  He 
looked to both Justice Miller’s statement in Slaughter-House that any 
federal citizen can “‘become a citizen of any State of the Union by a 
bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that 
State’”82 and Justice Bradley’s dissent that “used even stronger language 
to make the same point.”83  For Justice Stevens, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was essentially a nondiscrimination provision 
protecting the right to migrate and the right to travel.84  Justice Thomas 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist both wrote dissenting opinions.85 
Although obviously not shy about invoking the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, given McDonald, Justice Thomas did not see Saenz 
as the proper case for its resurrection.86  Since the case only involved 
                                                     
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 498 (“The word ‘travel’ is not found in the text of the Constitution.  Yet the 
‘constitutional right to travel from one State to another’ is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.” 
(quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966))). 
 77. See id. at 510–11 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
 78. Id. at 500. 
 79. Id. at 502. 
 80. Id. at 503. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1873)). 
 83. Id. (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 112–13 (Bradley, J., dissenting)). 
 84. Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of “Privileges or Immunities”: Saenz v. Roe, 119 
S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 304 (2000). 
 85. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 86. See id. at 527–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I would be open to reevaluating [the Privileges 
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benefits established by positive law, and not fundamental rights, only the 
Equal Protection Clause could possibly be relevant.87  To Justice 
Thomas, the Saenz majority “attribute[d] a meaning to the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause that likely was unintended when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was enacted and ratified.”88  Because the Saenz majority 
failed to ascertain the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, the Slaughter-House opinions and the majority’s consensus on 
the right to travel were irrelevant to an analysis under the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.89 
Justice Thomas chastised Justice Stevens’s invocation of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as “yet another convenient tool for 
inventing new rights, limited solely by the ‘predilections of those who 
happen at the time to be Members of this Court.’”90  Justice Thomas 
believed that Justice Washington’s 1825 opinion in Corfield v. Coryell 
defined “privileges” and “immunities” according to their historical 
understanding—only those “fundamental rights that belong to all citizens 
of the United States.”91  The majority’s use of Slaughter-House “fail[ed] 
to address its historical underpinnings or its place in . . . constitutional 
jurisprudence.”92  Justice Scalia, along with Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor, silently joined the majority in a 7–2 decision.93  Over a 
decade later, Justice Thomas found a more proper opportunity to invoke 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause—and he seized it.94 
III. MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO 
In the 2010 case of McDonald v. City of Chicago, a group of 
petitioners used the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to argue that the rights guaranteed under the Second 
Amendment should apply to the States.95  Despite ruling for the 
                                                                                                                       
or Immunities Clause’s] meaning in an appropriate case.”). 
 87. See id. at 526–28; see also Lemper, supra note 84, at 308. 
 88. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 89. See id. at 522, 527 (noting the majority’s failure to examine the Clause’s original meaning 
and that Slaughter-House had “sapped the Clause of any meaning”). 
 90. Id. at 528 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)). 
 91. Id. at 525–26 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 
3,230)). 
 92. Id. at 527. 
 93. Id. at 491 (majority opinion). 
 94. See infra Part III.B. 
 95. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3028 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
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petitioners, the Court chose not to use the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause—opting instead for the more conventional route through 
substantive due process.96  Justice Thomas’s powerful concurring 
opinion, however, embraced the petitioners’ argument and supported the 
enforcement of the Second Amendment against the States via the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.97 
The petitioner-plaintiffs in McDonald challenged gun-control laws in 
Chicago and Oak Park, Illinois that banned handgun possession by 
private citizens.98  They claimed that these restrictions violated their 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as extended in the 
Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.99  They argued 
that the Fourteenth Amendment should enforce the Second Amendment 
against the States—primarily under the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
and secondarily under the Due Process Clause.100  The petitioners 
asserted that the Court should reject the Slaughter-House interpretation 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as overly narrow.101  The 
respondents, in addition to arguing that the right to keep and bear arms 
was not fundamental enough to be incorporated via the Due Process 
Clause,102 argued that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was also 
merely a nondiscrimination rule, designed to protect the rights of former 
slaves after the Civil War.103 
A. Justice Alito’s Plurality Opinion 
1. Applying via the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
While the Court did not explicitly reject the argument based on the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, it found no reason to revisit Slaughter-
House and decided to adhere to decades of precedent by applying the 
Due Process Clause to Fourteenth Amendment claims of State 
infringement.104  Justice Alito opened the plurality opinion by addressing 
                                                     
 96. Id. at 3030–31. 
 97. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 98. Id. at 3027 (plurality opinion). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 3028. 
 101. Petitioners’ Brief at 42–65, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521). 
 102. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park at 7, 64, McDonald, 130 S. 
Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521). 
 103. Id. at 42–81. 
 104. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31 (plurality opinion). 
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the issue as the petitioners hoped he would, by discussing the Barron 
aftermath and the need for some vehicle to incorporate the Bill of Rights 
against the States—the Privileges or Immunities Clause.105  Naturally, his 
analysis started with the Fourteenth Amendment and, of course, 
Slaughter-House.106  He discussed Slaughter-House’s majority opinion 
as well as the dissents of Justices Field, Swayne, and Bradley.107  He then 
aptly stated that “[t]oday, many legal scholars dispute the correctness of 
the narrow Slaughter-House interpretation,” but gave no further 
discussion of the case.108  He then mentioned three nineteenth century 
cases—United States v. Cruikshank,109 Presser v. Illinois,110 and Miller v. 
Texas,111 which held that the Second Amendment applied only to the 
Federal Government—and the petitioners’ argument for overturning 
those cases and Slaughter-House.112  Justice Alito did not discuss these 
cases as they related to privileges or immunities.113 
Justice Alito declined to overturn Slaughter-House and noted that the 
petitioners could not identify the full scope of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause nor was there consensus on the issue among the 
scholars who believe Slaughter-House was incorrectly decided.114  There 
was no real need to reconsider the interpretation of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause in this case because “[f]or many decades, the question 
of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state 
infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that 
Amendment and not under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”115 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality’s refusal to 
overturn Slaughter-House and its decision to adjudicate the case under 
the Due Process Clause.116  Like Justice Alito, he was hesitant to 
overturn 137 years of precedent.117  Justice Stevens noted that “[t]he 
                                                     
 105. Id. at 3028. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 3029. 
 108. See id. (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999)). 
 109. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 110. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 111. 153 U.S. 535 (1894). 
 112. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027–31 (plurality opinion). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 3030–31. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 3089–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 3089; see id. at 3028–36 (plurality opinion) (discussing the long history of 
incorporation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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burden is severe for those who seek radical change in such an established 
body of constitutional doctrine.”118  Though he admitted that the 
petitioners amassed “impressive” evidence supporting their interpretation 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, he argued that “the original 
meaning of the Clause is not as clear as they suggest.”119 
2. Incorporation via the Due Process Clause 
Justice Alito instead used the existing precedent under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Second 
Amendment against the States.120  First, he rejected the late-nineteenth 
century precedent of Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller as inapplicable 
because they preceded the modern jurisprudence on the issue.121  They 
were irrelevant because they did not “‘engage[] in the sort of Fourteenth 
Amendment inquiry required by . . . later cases.’”122 
Under the Due Process Clause, the Court has incorporated most of 
the protections of the first eight amendments against the States, but not 
all.123  To determine whether a particular protection in the Bill of Rights 
applies to the States, Justice Alito saw Duncan v. Louisiana124 and 
Washington v. Glucksberg125 as the controlling precedent.126  The 
Duncan test asked “whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.”127  
The more recent Glucksberg test asked, in a similar context, whether the 
right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”128  For 
Justice Alito and the plurality, the Second Amendment right of 
individual self-defense satisfied those tests.129 
The 2008 District of Columbia v. Heller decision made this an easy 
determination for Justice Alito.130  The Heller decision, written by Justice 
                                                     
 118. Id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 3089 & n.2 (gathering sources that illustrate the division on this topic). 
 120. Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion). 
 121. Id. at 3031. 
 122. Id. at 3031 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620 n.23 (2008)). 
 123. Id. at 3034–35.  This is commonly referred to as “selective incorporation.”  Id. at 3034. 
 124. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 125. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 126. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034, 3036 (plurality opinion). 
 127. Id. at 3034 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149). 
 128. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, quoted in McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (plurality opinion). 
 129. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036–38 (plurality opinion). 
 130. Id. at 3036. 
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Scalia, struck down a District of Columbia law banning handgun 
possession in the home.131  The Court held that the D.C. law infringed 
upon a Second Amendment right to individual self-defense, which was 
“a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to 
the present day.”132  Specifically, the Court noted that “individual self-
defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right.”133  
Thus, under Heller, the Second Amendment requires that “citizens must 
be permitted ‘to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-
defense’” in federal enclaves such as Washington, D.C.134 
In deciding whether this federal right should apply to the States, 
Justice Alito noted how Heller traced the origin of the Second 
Amendment back to the 1689 English Bill of Rights.135  American 
colonists enjoyed the right to keep and bear arms, and the Framers of the 
Constitution during the 1788 ratification debates considered it a 
fundamental right.136  Applying the Heller decision to the Glucksberg 
test, Justice Alito wrote, “Heller makes it clear that this right is ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”137 
Finally, Justice Alito argued in McDonald that it was the express 
intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect Second 
Amendment rights against State infringement.138  He pointed to the 
debates of the thirty-ninth Congress in which sponsors of the Fourteenth 
Amendment mentioned the right to bear arms as being protected by it.139  
Justice Alito also pointed out that in the years after the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, members of Congress acknowledged the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s role in applying Second Amendment 
protection to the states.140 
                                                     
 131. Id. at 3026 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576, 636 (2008)). 
 132. Id. at 3036. 
 133. Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599). 
 134. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 630). 
 135. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–95). 
 136. See id. at 3037 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598–603). 
 137. Id. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
 138. See id. at 3040–41. 
 139. Id. at 3041 (“Senator Samuel Pomeroy described three ‘indispensable’ ‘safeguards of liberty 
under our form of Government.’”  (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1182 (1866))). 
 140. Id. at 3041–42. 
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B. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in McDonald laid out the framework 
for abdicating the doctrine of substantive due process in favor of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Before 
ascertaining the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Justice Thomas dealt with Slaughter-House and its progeny.  He first 
cited Slaughter-House’s distinction between state and federal 
citizenship141 and noted Justice Miller’s possible lifeboat for 
incorporation by his mention of the right to assemble and the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus.142  Justice Thomas then explained that any 
notion of incorporation in Slaughter-House disappeared three years later 
in Cruikshank when the Court held that the First and Second 
Amendments were natural rights predating the Constitution and, 
therefore, not privileges of United States citizenship.143  After dismissing 
the Court’s decision in Saenz v. Roe, he began his assault on the true 
villain of this story—substantive due process.144 
Justice Thomas argued that with the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
marginalized under Slaughter-House and Cruikshank, those seeking 
federal protection of fundamental rights had to go elsewhere in the 
Constitution and found the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.145  At first, the provision only incorporated against the 
States those rights that were “sufficiently ‘fundamental’” and “essential 
to the scheme of ordered liberty,” but eventually the Court also enforced 
unenumerated rights against the States via the Due Process Clause.146  As 
examples, he cited three of the most infamous cases involving 
substantive due process—Lochner v. New York,147 Roe v. Wade,148 and 
                                                     
 141. See id. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice 
Thomas pointed out that the Slaughter-House Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
only protects federal citizenship and not state citizenship.  Id. (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873)). 
 142. Id. at 3061; see supra text accompanying notes 61–70. 
 143. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551, 553 (1876)). 
 144. See id. at 3061–63.  “The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only 
‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those 
rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.”  Id. at 3062. 
 145. Id. at 3061. 
 146. Id. at 3061–62 (quoting id. at 3046 (plurality opinion)). 
 147. 198 U.S. 45, 53, 64–65 (1905) (finding that a New York labor law infringed upon the 
freedom of contract as a “liberty of the individual protected by the [Fourteenth] Amendment”). 
 148. 410 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1973) (finding that a Texas law prohibiting abortion violated the 
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Lawrence v. Texas.149  Despite his agreement with the plurality that the 
Second Amendment protects a fundamental right, he lumped the plurality 
opinion in with Lochner, Roe, and Lawrence to demonstrate the folly of 
using that method of incorporation, which he considers a “legal fiction” 
that lacks a guiding principle.150 
Justice Thomas finally had an opportunity to ascertain “the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment agreed upon by those who ratified it.”151  
Reasoning that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment would have 
written it to be understood by the voters, Justice Thomas explained that 
his real task was finding what “‘ordinary citizens’” would have 
understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean at the time of 
ratification.152  First, he pointed out the terms “privileges” and 
“immunities” had a long tradition, going back centuries in England, as 
being synonymous with “rights.”153  He pointed out that the public’s 
previous understanding of their privileges and immunities as citizens of 
the several states provided under Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution 
to further his case—privileges and immunities are only those rights 
“‘which are, in their nature, fundamental.’”154  Article IV, Section 2 
therefore kept States from denying traveling citizens the fundamental 
rights they guaranteed to their own citizens.155 
But Justice Thomas still faced two huge questions of constitutional 
interpretation.  First, he asked, “[a]re the privileges or immunities of 
‘citizens of the United States’ recognized by § 1 the same as the 
privileges and immunities of ‘citizens in the Several States’ to which 
Article IV, § 2 refers?”156  Justice Thomas answered that the evidence 
“overwhelmingly demonstrates” that the privileges and immunities 
protected by Section 1 included individual enumerated constitutional 
rights, such as the right to bear arms.157 
                                                                                                                       
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 149. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (finding that a Texas law prohibiting certain sexual conduct 
between individuals of the same sex violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 150. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 151. Id. at 3063. 
 152. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 3067 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 
3,230)). 
 155. Id. at 3068. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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Drawing on a variety of sources, Justice Thomas focused primarily 
on the context in which the thirty-ninth Congress enacted the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it “illuminates what the public understood the 
words chosen by the draftsmen to mean.”158  He pointed to a speech by 
the main author of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative John 
Bingham, that expressly advocated that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment enforced the Bill of Rights against the States.159  
Representative Bingham’s speech was published as a pamphlet and 
distributed across the country.160  The sponsor of the Amendment in the 
Senate, Senator Jacob Howard, made a similar argument on the Senate 
Floor.161  Senator Howard’s speech was published and discussed in 
newspapers across the country.162  Justice Thomas concluded that these 
statements, among others, “point unambiguously toward the conclusion 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause enforces at least those 
fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution against the States.”163 
Second, Justice Thomas asked, “[d]oes § 1, like Article IV, § 2, 
prohibit only discrimination with respect to certain rights if the State 
chooses to recognize them, or does it require States to recognize those 
rights?”164  Justice Thomas rejected the interpretation that Section 1 is 
merely a nondiscrimination clause, stating: 
Section 1 guaranteed the rights of citizenship in the United States 
and in the several States without regard to race.  But it was understood 
that liberty would be assured little protection if § 1 left each State to 
decide which privileges or immunities of United States citizenship it 
would protect.165 
The drafters, therefore, intended the Clause to establish a “minimum 
baseline of federal rights” for all Americans.166 
Finally, Justice Thomas dealt with the fact that his analysis would 
effectively overturn more than a century of Supreme Court precedent 
                                                     
 158. Id. at 3072. 
 159. Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1089–90 (1866)). 
 160. Id. at 3073. 
 161. Id. at 3073–74 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2765–66). 
 162. Id. at 3074. 
 163. Id. at 3075. 
 164. Id. at 3068. 
 165. Id. at 3083. 
 166. Id. 
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beginning with Slaughter-House and Cruikshank.167  Though Justice 
Thomas is certainly not the Court’s most faithful guardian of stare 
decisis, he acknowledged its importance and longevity and recognized 
that his reasoning broke new ground in modern jurisprudence.168  He did 
not hesitate, however, to reject both the Slaughter-House definition of 
privileges or immunities of federal citizenship and the application of 
Slaughter-House in Cruikshank.169  In his view, given the historical 
evidence, privileges or immunities of federal and state citizenship should 
overlap; therefore, Slaughter-House was incorrect in that regard.170  
Despite the precedent of Slaughter-House and Cruikshank—which he 
dismissed—Justice Thomas saw the historical evidence in favor of 
incorporating the Second Amendment against the States as too strong to 
ignore.171 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. The Plurality’s Unsatisfying Discussion of Privileges or Immunities 
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion was extremely disappointing for 
originalists who hoped to fully revive the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, especially given the manner in which the Court did it—devoting 
only 172 words to the topic.172  Alan Gura, counsel for petitioners in 
McDonald, and Ilya Shapiro, Editor-in-Chief of the Cato Institute’s 
Supreme Court Review, described the plurality’s opinion as 
“uncharacteristically curt” and “odd” given the importance of the 
issue.173 
Although the plurality mentioned the Slaughter-House dissents of 
Justices Bradley, Field, and Swayne and admitted that “many legal 
scholars” dispute the Slaughter-House interpretation,174 they failed to 
                                                     
 167. Id. at 3084. 
 168. See id. at 3062–63.  “I further acknowledge the importance of stare decisis to the stability of 
our Nation’s legal system.  But stare decisis is only an ‘adjunct’ of our duty as judges to decide by 
our best lights what the Constitution means.  It is not ‘an inexorable command.’”  Id. (citations 
omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 963 (1992); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003)). 
 169. See id. at 3086–88. 
 170. Id. at 3087. 
 171. Id. at 3088. 
 172. Gura, Shapiro & Blackman, supra note 8, at 178. 
 173. Id. at 177–78. 
 174. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3029–30 (plurality opinion) (gathering sources that illustrate the 
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give any meaningful consideration to overturning Slaughter-House.  
Noting petitioners’ inability to identify the full scope of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and lack of consensus among Slaughter-House critics 
on the issue, the plurality “decline[d] to disturb the Slaughter-House 
holding”175 without so much as a paragraph of inquiry as to the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause itself.176 
Despite acknowledging that the right to bear arms is “‘deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition’”177 and citing many of the same 
sources as Justice Thomas about the understanding of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment at the time it was adopted,178 the plurality 
refused to discuss or investigate which clause in Section 1 was intended 
by the authors to be used to apply the Bill of Rights to the States.179  
Gura and Shapiro point out that Justice Alito cited a statement by Senator 
Howard that expressly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment protected 
the rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments180 but failed to 
recognize that the topic of Senator Howard’s speech was not the 
Fourteenth Amendment in general or even Section 1—it was specifically 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.181  They further point out that 
Justice Alito made the same mistake again when referring to a similar 
statement by Representative Bingham182—pointing out that 
Representative Bingham specifically said, “‘[P]ermit me to say that the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, as 
contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the 
first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.’”183 
                                                                                                                       
disparate viewpoints). 
 175. Id. at 3030–31. 
 176. See id. at 3028–31 (discussing early Fourteenth Amendment cases but offering no 
explanation of the Clause’s original meaning). 
 177. Id. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
 178. See id. at 3033 n.9 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of 
Senator Jacob Howard)). 
 179. See id. at 3033 (noting simply that the Court has since embraced a selective-incorporation 
approach via the Due Process Clause). 
 180. Gura, Shapiro & Blackman, supra note 8, at 180. 
 181. Id. (“As shown in the fuller quote of the same speech . . . the subject of Howard’s speech 
was the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”). 
 182. Id. at 180–81. 
 183. Id. at 181 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 84 (1871)). 
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B. Why Scalia?  Why? 
Perhaps most disheartening for proponents of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, though not necessarily surprising given his joining of 
the majority in Saenz v. Roe, was Justice Scalia’s refusal to sign on to 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence, or at least make his own case in his 
concurrence for why he would not use the Clause.  The esteemed Justice, 
who has been described as “the Court’s premier [judicial] conservative, 
intellectual gladiator, and chief wordsmith,”184 passed on a golden 
opportunity to go to bat for originalism185 and help turn the tide against 
his arch enemy—substantive due process.186  Instead, Justice Scalia 
embraced his nemesis, choosing stare decisis and expediency over 
originalism.187 
Shockingly, Justice Scalia only devoted fifty-five words in his 
concurrence to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.188  He merely wrote: 
I join the Court’s opinion.  Despite my misgivings about 
Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have acquiesced in the 
Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
“because it is both long established and narrowly limited.”  This case 
does not require me to reconsider that view, since straightforward 
application of settled doctrine suffices to decide it.189 
Justice Scalia wrote his separate concurring opinion only to “respond to 
some aspects of Justice Stevens’ dissent.”190  The rest of the opinion 
disputes Justice Stevens’s claim that the living constitution method of 
incorporation is “more ‘cautiou[s]’ and respectful of proper limits on the 
judicial role.”191 
                                                     
 184. RING, supra note 9, at ix. 
 185. See Gura, Shapiro & Blackman, supra note 8, at 187 (“Justice Scalia could have 
demonstrated fidelity to the judicial method he would use to attack Justice Stevens by joining Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence.”). 
 186. See id. at 182 (stating that Justice Scalia has described substantive due process as “babble,” 
a “usurpation,” and an “atrocity”). 
 187. See id. at 184. 
 188. Id. at 182. 
 189. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  But see 
Gura, Shapiro & Blackman, supra note 8, at 182 (describing Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion as 
“quixotic”). 
 190. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 191. Id. at 3050 (alteration in original) (citing id. at 3119–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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While Justice Scalia’s opinion itself does not give much insight into 
his thought process on the issue, his exchanges during the McDonald oral 
argument are somewhat telling of his reasoning.  In this case, he was 
unusually concerned with stare decisis192 and the practicality of using 
substantive due process instead of overturning a century of precedent.  
Though he joined Justice Alito’s plurality opinion, he did not, however, 
seem worried about petitioners’ failure to define the scope of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
In oral arguments, Justice Scalia asked lead counsel for the 
petitioners, “do you think [it is] at all easier to bring the Second 
Amendment under the Privileges [or] Immunities Clause than it is to 
bring it under our established law of substantive due [process]?”193 
Justice Scalia continued, “[a]nd if the answer is no, why are you asking 
us to overrule . . . 140 years of prior law . . . when you can reach your 
result under substantive due [process]?”194  He then referred to the 
petitioners’ argument as “the darling of the professoriate”195 and inquired 
why the petitioners would take on the heavy burden of incorporating via 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and overturning Slaughter-House 
instead of simply using substantive due process.196  But, he did not ask 
any questions concerning the creation or limitation of unenumerated 
rights.197 
Recall that Justice Scalia silently voted with the majority in Saenz, 
where the Court protected an unenumerated right to travel using the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.198  Therefore, Justice Scalia agreed with 
Justice Stevens’s statement that the right to travel is “firmly embedded in 
our jurisprudence,”199 “so important that it is ‘assertable against private 
interference as well as governmental action, . . . [and] a virtually 
unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution.’”200  The 
Saenz majority believed the right to travel “has always been common 
                                                     
 192. See RING, supra note 9, at 15 (stating that “some critics assert that while Scalia decries 
judicial activism, he is an activist himself because he often votes to strike down laws and overturn 
Court precedents,” however, “when he has ignored the doctrine of stare decisis[,] . . . he has done so 
because the Court’s previous holding had no foundation in constitutional text”). 
 193. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 6. 
 194. Id. at 6–7. 
 195. Id. at 7. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. at 6–17. 
 198. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 491 (1999). 
 199. Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)). 
 200. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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ground,”201 and it relied on both Justice Miller’s majority opinion and 
Justice Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House as evidence.202 
Justice Stevens acknowledged that he agreed with the McDonald 
plurality that the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not apply because 
“the original meaning of the Clause is not as clear as [the petitioners] 
suggest . . . and not nearly as clear as it would need to be to dislodge 137 
years of precedent.”203  But Justice Stevens did not hesitate to invoke the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause in Saenz.204  It seems Justice Stevens 
found three major differences between Saenz and McDonald.  First, 
Saenz did not require overturning Slaughter-House.205  Second, the scope 
of the right was limited and clearer in Saenz than it was in McDonald.  
Third, McDonald involved the Second Amendment, which is already 
covered under substantive due process. 
C. The Future 
1. Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause Without Overturning 
Slaughter-House 
Overturning Slaughter-House is not necessarily a prerequisite to 
reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Slaughter-House did not 
involve any claims under the first eight amendments, and Justice Miller’s 
opinion did not explicitly deny incorporation of the Bill of Rights.206  
The right to travel at issue in Saenz was not at issue in Slaughter-House 
and was only mentioned in dicta by the Court.207  While Slaughter-House 
is a huge hurdle, it should not necessarily preclude a continued 
discussion of the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  In 
fact, there is a strong case for reinterpreting Slaughter-House to include 
Bill of Rights protections.208  The current Court could do this by 
                                                     
 201. Id. at 503. 
 202. Id. (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1873); id. at 112–13 
(Bradley, J., dissenting)). 
 203. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3089 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
 204. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503. 
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distinguishing between the common law economic rights that were at 
issue in Slaughter-House and “core Bill of Rights freedoms”209 such as 
the Second Amendment protections at issue in McDonald. 
2. Defining the Scope of Federal Privileges or Immunities 
The McDonald plurality and Justice Stevens correctly note that the 
full scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is unclear, especially 
when it comes to unenumerated rights.  This is a major question in 
constitutional law that should draw continued discussion.  Even Justice 
Thomas admits that “[l]egal scholars agree on little beyond the 
conclusion that the Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant in 
1873.”210  In Saenz, however, Justices Scalia and Stevens used the Clause 
to invoke an unenumerated right, yet expressed no reservations about not 
fully defining the scope of federal privileges or immunities.211  In 
contrast, the McDonald petitioners did not ask for total incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights, nor did they ask for an unenumerated right—they 
merely asked the Court to enforce one right against the states, which was 
the individual right to keep and bear arms for self defense in the home 
under the Second Amendment.212  So, why then would Justices Scalia 
and Stevens, who disagreed over the McDonald outcome and the nature 
of the Second Amendment, be content using the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in Saenz, but not in McDonald?  The answer is, of course, 
substantive due process. 
3. Privileges or Immunities Dies Again? 
Justice Scalia’s questions during oral argument,213 his 
concurrence,214 and the plurality opinion215 all show that he based his 
acquiescence to substantive due process on a pragmatic and realistic 
evaluation of the state of modern constitutional jurisprudence.  After 
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years of dissenting valiantly while the Court recognized more and more 
unenumerated rights, Justice Scalia has shifted his focus.  Instead of 
expressing his “misgivings” about substantive due process and fighting 
the good fight, perhaps he is now using the twilight of his remarkable 
career on the bench to help shape the future of substantive due process 
jurisprudence on the Roberts Court, instead of tearing it down. 
While the plurality opinion may be considered incorrect by true 
originalists, it is indeed a practical course of action.  In the end, the 
Second Amendment was still enforced against the States.  Justice Scalia 
even got the petitioners’ counsel in McDonald to admit during oral 
argument that the tests for whether a right is fundamental under 
substantive due process and the Privileges or Immunities Clause are 
nearly identical.216  Sure, Justice Scalia may have doomed the rebirth of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause before it ever occurred, but even if 
he had not acquiesced, it is very unlikely that the “misgivings” he has 
about substantive due process would have been rectified by reviving the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence, while lone and underappreciated by 
the other eight members of the Court, could serve as the foundation for a 
future Supreme Court to reconsider the meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.  The “privileges” and “immunities” of federal 
citizenship, regardless of their scope, have a long history in this country.  
They were certainly important enough that the authors of the Fourteenth 
Amendment decided to include them in Section 1—directly before the 
Due Process Clause.217 
Even if the Privileges or Immunities Clause is forever doomed to 
remain “the darling of the professoriate,”218 the prerogative of defining 
constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities is still left to the 
Supreme Court under the Due Process Clause.  Because the tests for 
determining the applicability of rights against the States under the 
Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses are nearly identical, it 
is likely that originalist members of the Court will still have the 
framework available to limit the creation of unenumerated rights.  Using 
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the Due Process Clause is much less controversial and allows the Court 
to make incremental progress without drawing the controversy of 
overturning Slaughter-House and 138 years of precedent.  Even if the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause remains dead, however, the Court, as 
well as the professoriate, should at the very least consider its original 
meaning and use it as a guidepost when determining what rights are 
fundamental under substantive due process.  This may be the practical 
solution to remaining faithful to both stare decisis and the authors of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
